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NORTH SEA ECONOMICS 
 
Research in North Sea Economics has been conducted in the Economics Department 
since 1973.  The present and likely future effects of oil and gas developments on the 
Scottish economy formed the subject of a long term study undertaken for the Scottish 
Office.  The final report of this study, The Economic Impact of North Sea Oil on 
Scotland, was published by HMSO in 1978.  In more recent years further work has 
been done on the impact of oil on local economies and on the barriers to entry and 
characteristics of the supply companies in the offshore oil industry. 
 
The second and longer lasting theme of research has been an analysis of licensing and 
fiscal regimes applied to petroleum exploitation.  Work in this field was initially 
financed by a major firm of accountants, by British Petroleum, and subsequently by 
the Shell Grants Committee.  Much of this work has involved analysis of fiscal 
systems in other oil producing countries including Australia, Canada, the United 
States, Indonesia, Egypt, Nigeria and Malaysia.  Because of the continuing interest in 
the UK fiscal system many papers have been produced on the effects of this regime. 
 
From 1985 to 1987 the Economic and Social Science Research Council financed 
research on the relationship between oil companies and Governments in the UK, 
Norway, Denmark and The Netherlands.  A main part of this work involved the 
construction of Monte Carlo simulation models which have been employed to 
measure the extents to which fiscal systems share in exploration and development 
risks. 
 
Over the last few years the research has examined the many evolving economic issues 
generally relating to petroleum investment and related fiscal and regulatory matters.  
Subjects researched include the economics of incremental investments in mature oil 
fields, economic aspects of the CRINE initiative, economics of gas developments and 
contracts in the new market situation, economic and tax aspects of tariffing, 
economics of infrastructure cost sharing, the effects of comparative petroleum fiscal 
systems on incentives to develop fields and undertake new exploration, the oil price 
responsiveness of the UK petroleum tax system, and the economics of 
decommissioning, mothballing and re-use of facilities.  This work has been financed 
by a group of oil companies and Scottish Enterprise, Energy.  The work on CO2 
Capture, EOR and storage was financed by a grant from the Natural Environmental 
Research Council (NERC) in the period 2005 – 2008.  
 
For 2013 the programme examines the following subjects: 
 
a) Refining/Streamlining the Field Allowances for SC 
b) Economics of Exploration in the UKCS: the 2013 Perspective 
c) Third Party Access to Infrastructure 
d) Economics of EOR in UKCS 
e) Economics of CO2 EOR 
f) Prospects for Activity Levels in the UKCS: the 2013 Perspective 
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g) Economics of Issues Relating to Decommissioning 
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An Optimised Investment Model of the Economics of 
Integrated Returns from CCS Deployment in the 
UK/UKCS 
 
Professor Alexander G. Kemp 
and 
Sola Kasim 
 
Abstract 
In spite of the UK Government’s ambition for at least 20 GW of CCS to be deployed in the 
UK/UKCS by 2030, the attitude of potential investors thus far remains lukewarm.  Several 
reasons have been adduced for this.  The present paper makes a contribution to the debate on 
removing the barriers to CCS investment by investigating the criteria and scope for 
negotiation among the CCS investors of mutually acceptable prices for trading the captured 
CO2 and storage services.  A decision-making framework was deployed to design and 
implement an investment model, using the Net Present Value criterion.  Stochastic 
optimisation was executed and optimal solutions found for the investors within a range of 
carbon prices and sequestration fees.  This range permits negotiation among the participants 
in the CCS chain to the mutual benefit of all, compatible with a co-operative Nash-type 
equilibrium. 
 
Keywords:  Integrated CCS investment, CO2 pricing, Optimized investment returns, CO2-
EOR 
 
JEL classification: C61, Q49, L91, D40 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Several studies have focused attention on the economics of investments in 
CO2 capture, transport and storage (CCS).  Few have adopted an 
integrated system approach, especially against the backdrop of an official 
carbon price.  Yet there are obvious advantages to this approach in which 
maximizing the overall returns is achieved through the optimisation of 
investments at each stage of the CCS chain, consistent with the feedback 
signals from the other stages.   
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Being a relatively new technology in the UK/UKCS, investment in the 
integrated CCS value chain faces a number of uncertainties.  These are 
technological, economic, legal and geological in nature.  At the capture 
stage there are uncertainties regarding which technology is the most cost 
effective, and how quickly and reliably it can be deployed on a wide 
scale.  At the transport stage, uncertainties about the exact composition of 
the captured CO2 to be transported make difficult a decision on the design 
of pipelines to construct or modify.  At the storage stage, there are 
uncertainties regarding the development and deployment of the 
appropriate technology, the yield of the EOR from each tonne of CO2 
injected, and the oil price.  At all stages there are cost uncertainties.  
Regarding the regulatory framework there are uncertainties concerning 
(a) the extent, stringency, and reach of emission-reduction controls, and, 
(b) the transfer of financial liability from the investor to the Government.     
 
Regarding the economics, the determination of the price of the captured 
CO2 remains uncertain.  Abadie and Chamorro (2008) highlighted the 
riskiness of electricity and emission allowance prices as possible 
disincentives to capture investment.  Also, there are uncertainties as to 
which business model is best suited to the early deployment of the 
technology.  Kettunen, Bunn and Blyth (2011) demonstrated that 
uncertainty regarding carbon policy may encourage market concentration, 
with the relatively less risk averse, financially stronger, larger power 
plants being better able to undertake carbon-reduction investments.  But 
vertical integration or trading relationships between independent parties 
are also distinct possibilities.  Klokk et al.  (2010) optimised an integrated 
CCS value chain without representing distinctly the individual 
stakeholders, though acknowledging that a single owner of the entire 
CCS value chain seems improbable.    
3 
 
 
Akin to the market-led, disaggregated  industry model described in 
DECC (2012c), the present study contributes to understanding by 
optimising an integrated CCS value chain in which the stakeholders are 
distinct, independent, and trading among themselves on the basis of 
commercial contracts.  Unlike the earlier studies, the overarching 
approach is one of stochastic optimisation.  Also, while Klokk et al. chose 
sites in the Norwegian Continental Shelf, the present study involves sites 
in the UK/UKCS.  The valuation of the captured CO2 is positive in the 
present study but is zero-valued in Klokk et al.   
 
2. The Model 
The conceptual framework 
This study develops an economic decision-making framework for the 
design of a CCS investment model to analyse the chain of activities 
involving trading among investors at the capture, transportation and 
EOR/storage stages, using the Net Present Value (NPV) criterion as its 
basis.  The CO2 storage investor uses q1 as an input into producing oil 
which he sells at international prices.  After the EOR phase, he stores q2 
in the depleted oilfield for a fee.  Capture-favourable and EOR-
favourable scenarios are examined.  The capture-favourable case is where 
market and/or regulatory conditions favour a relatively high price for CO2 
and a relatively low storage fee.  The EOR-favourable scenario arises 
when market and/or regulatory conditions combine to signal a relatively 
high storage fee and low CO2 price.     
 
From the perspective of the capture investor, let p1 (p1>0) be the asking 
price of q1 and p2 (p2>0) the offer storage fee for storing q2.  From the 
perspective of the storage investor, let p1s be the offer price for the 
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captured CO2 and p2s the asking storage fee to store q2.  The study 
investigates the mechanics of determining the scope for negotiation 
within which lies the agreed prices p1
*
 and p2
*
 of the captured CO2 and 
storage service respectively.  One expects that {p1s< p1
*
<p1} and, {p2< p2
*
<p2s}.  
Agreement on p1
*
 and p2
*
 are central to the decision to undertake CO2 
capture and/or EOR investment.  The agreed p1
* may be different from any 
official price such as the UK’s Carbon Price Floor (CPF)1.     
 
Given that the capture point source and EOR sink are assumed to be some 
distance apart, a transport investor is needed to provide the infrastructure 
and service to deliver Q(=q1+q2) from the supplier to the end-user.  The 
related optimal transportation fee is determined, treating the 
transportation service as a utility.  
 
The objective function 
Within the framework of their interdependence, each investor will seek to 
maximise his own returns and restrict his risk exposure. Thus, the capture 
investor seeks to:      
 
Maximise: 
  0 1 2
1
(2.1)
T
tc tt t tt
t
C q DqNPV   

    
 
     1 2; ; 1
t
t t t t t t t t tz p n w z p n w D r 

            
where: 
NPVc = the Net Present Value of the CO2 capture investment. 
C0 = Initial (project development phase) incremental CAPEX 
zt   = Official carbon price for emission rights at time t 
p1t= the asking price of the captured CO2 for EOR at time t 
                                                 
1
 Discussed in detail below. 
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p2t= the capture investor’s offer CO2 storage fee at time t  
q1t = the volume of captured CO2 for EOR at time t (t=1, 2 ...h) 
q2t = the volume of captured CO2 for sequestration at time t (t=h+1, h+2 ...T) 
nt = unit CO2 transportation cost at time t. 
wt= unit fuel and non-fuel capture OPEX (including CO2 separation cost) at time t  
κt=incremental CAPEX incurred at time t 
t = time in years 
h = end-year EOR phase 
T = terminal year 
r = the discount rate 
Dt = the discount factor at time t  
 
Equation (2.1) states the capture investor’s objective of maximising the 
NPV.  The revenues consist of receipts from the sale of the captured CO2 
(p1tq1t) and the shadow revenues, Zt (=ztQt), which are the savings from not 
having to purchase emission rights.  The costs are the CAPEX, C0 and κt, 
and, OPEX (= ntQt + wtQt +p2tq2t = Nt +Bt + St), where Nt, Bt, and St are 
respectively the annual transportation, capture, and storage costs.   The 
elements of the cost and revenue components of the equation are 
discussed further in section 3.2.  The necessary conditions for maximising 
the investor’s current profit with respect to q1 and q2 require: 
(a) Equalising his marginal revenue (MR) and marginal cost (MC) for 
q1, and deriving the asking carbon price as:   
1 10: (2.1 )t t t t t t t tp n w z z p z a      
 
From equation (2.1a) the capture investor’s asking price is determined by 
his costs and the exogenously-determined official carbon price (unit 
shadow revenue).  The latter (zt) sets a ceiling to the asking price (p1t).  
(b) Equalising his MR and MC for q2, and deriving the offer storage fee 
as: 
2 (2.1 )t t t t tp z n w b   
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The investor would not offer to pay a unit CO2 storage fee exceeding his 
unit carbon revenue.   
 In the case of the storage investor, the objective function is to:  
Maximise:  
  2 2 1 10
1
T
ss s
s st t st t t t ttt
t
p q p q X DNPV pC O 

                               (2.2) 
 1 2 1;t it t t t t tX x q q and O g q     
 
where in addition to previous definitions: 
NPVs = the Net Present Value of the CO2 storage project 
C
s
0 = the initial CO2-EOR CAPEX  
p
s
t = the international price of crude oil at time t  
Ot = the amount of CO2-EOR produced at time t 
Xt = OPEX excluding CO2 purchases at time t  
xit = unit OPEX excluding CO2 purchases at time t for period i (i=1=EOR phase, 2=post-
EOR.) 
gt =EOR yield per tonne of CO2 injected at time t 
s
t = the incremental CAPEX incurred at time t 
 
The important components of the storage investor’s OPEX, Xt, are the 
EOR-phase injection,     q1tx1t (t=1, 2 ...h) and, post-EOR injection and 
monitoring-for-leakage q2tx2t (t=h+1, h+2 ...T) expenditures.  Assuming that 
the monitoring cost is a fraction, α, of CAPEX and that the injection cost 
is the same in both phases, then x2t = (x1t + α) and, Xt = x1t (q1t+q2t) + αq2t, where 
the first term is the injection OPEX and the second is the monitoring one.  
The elements of the cost and revenue components of equation (2.2) are 
discussed in section 3.2.  The EOR investor’s necessary conditions for 
maximising profit with respect to q1t and q2t require: 
(a) Equalising during the EOR phase his MR and MC for q1, and 
deriving the offer carbon price as: 
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1 1 1 10: (2.2 )
s s
st t t t t st t tp p g x x p p g a    
 
According to (2.2a) the investor’s offer price for the CO2 is determined 
by the oil price, EOR yield ratio, and unit variable cost.  For any given oil 
price and unit OPEX, the carbon price would be less than the product of 
the oil price and the EOR yield ratio. The higher the yield ratio the more 
affordable is the carbon price. 
(b) Equalising his post-EOR MR and  MC for q2, and deriving the asking 
storage fee such that: 
2 2 (2.2 )st tp x b
 
That is, the storage fee must cover the unit post-EOR OPEX. 
The pipeline operator’s objective is to:  
Maximise: 
  0 1 2
1
( )
T
a
a t t t t t
t
q q y DNPV C n

       (2.3) 
where in addition to previous definitions: 
C
a
0= the pipeline operator’s CAPEX  
yt = transportation OPEX at time t 
 
The elements of the cost and revenue components of equation (2.3) are 
discussed in section 3.2. 
 
The Constraints 
The respective mean NPVs of equations (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) are 
maximised subject to a simultaneous non-negativity constraint.  That is,  
 , , 0c s aNPV NPV NPV    (2.4) 
The simultaneous satisfaction of the non-negativity constraint 
guarantees that no investor in the CCS value enjoys positive returns to 
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his investment while another investor in the chain suffers negative 
returns.   
 
3. Case Study – The UK/UKCS 
3.1 Overview 
The Solution Approach 
Integrated source-to-sink cash flow models were built to incorporate the 
model in equations 2.1 through 2.4 and applied to the UK/UKCS.    The 
model solutions were obtained by alternatively maximising NPVs in 
equations (2.2) and (2.3), subject in each case to the simultaneous 
satisfaction of the non-negativity constraint in equation (2.4).  Oracle’s 
Crystal Ball software for Monte Carlo probabilistic analyses of 
investment returns, including OptQuest its optimising engine, were used 
to determine the optimal values of the decision variables. 
 
The Time Horizon 
The study covers a thirty-year period, 2020 – 2050, with the following 
notable dates: 
Date Activity 
2020 First CAPEX of CO2 capture, pipeline infrastructure, 
platform/well modifications.   
2023 Initial CO2-EOR shipment and delivery; CO2-EOR injection starts 
at the EOR field. 
2025 First CO2-EOR produced. 
2041 Primary CO2-EOR injection ends. 
2042 CO2 injection into pure storage commences in the field. 
It is envisaged that the CCS-related activities continue beyond 2050. 
 
The Discount Rate 
All the simulations and optimisations were performed using a discount 
rate of 10% to reflect the multiple risks involved.  This rate is commonly 
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used in studies on this subject.  Thus Mott MacDonald (2010) employs 
10%, as does Oil and Gas UK (2012).  The UK Carbon Capture and 
Storage Cost Reduction Task Force (DECC, 2012c) uses 10% for capture 
and transport investments, and 14% for storage investments.  
  
The CO2 sources and sink 
One hypothetical retrofitted onshore UK power plant with Pulverised 
Coal with Supercritical boiler and Flue Gas Desulphurisation 
(PCSCFGD) was used as a case study.  Post-combustion CO2 capture is 
assumed to be deployed.  The medium CO2-emitting power plant has a 
generating capacity of about 2,000 MW and annual emissions of between 
9 and 10 MtCO2/year. The plant is assumed to have a target of reducing 
its Emission Performance Standard (EPS) (emission factor) from about 
592 (tCO2/GWh) to about 505 (tCO2/GWh)
 2
.  The plant is assumed to be 
located on the East coast of Scotland.  After capture the CO2 is 
compressed and transported about 340 kilometres to an offshore CO2-
EOR field Z located in the Central North Sea.  The transportation of CO2 
to and its injection at field Z is assumed to commence before the closure 
of the field’s CO2-EOR “window of opportunity” (see Bachu (2004), and 
Kemp and Kasim (2010)).   
 
The power plant and oil field data used in the study were largely obtained 
from the literature and public domain sources. 
 
3.2 Model variables and data 
Model variables in OptQuest are classified as being either stochastic or 
“decision” ones.  In the model application, the cash flow statements of the 
                                                 
2
 For comparison, the EPS requirement on new coal-fired plants (until 2045) in the UK’s Electricity 
Market Reform is 450 (tCO2/GWh) (DECC, 2012a).  
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CCS investors include 16 cost and revenue variables, 10 of which are 
stochastic and the rest decision ones.   
 
In projecting the future values of the stochastic variables it is notable that 
neither historic nor futures prices exist for most of them.  Uncertainties 
regarding future outcomes are reflected in a two-stage approach.  This 
involves making a deterministic or stochastic (where historic data were 
available) forecast of the influencing variables, and secondly by 
determining and using the best-fit probability distributions of the possible 
occurrences of the deterministic forecasts in the optimisation runs.   
 
CO2 capture investment  
(a) the decision variables 
The power plant owner has two decision variables.  In equation (2.1) the 
cost-related one is the incremental CAPEX. The capture CAPEX is 
defined as the product of the unit capital cost (k) and the capture capacity 
(Q).  The unit CAPEX, k,  is assumed to range between £3
3
 and £6 per 
tonne of the installed CO2 capture capacity, with the lower end of the 
range being possible in the latter years owing to the benefits of learning-
by-doing (LBD) effects
4
.  κt is assumed to be incurred incrementally over 
a period of ten years.  The gradual build-up of the capture capacity is 
consistent with UK Government thinking (see DECC, 2009b).   
The second decision variable in equation (2.1) is p1t, the asking price of 
the captured CO2.  The investor seeks to negotiate as high a price as 
possible up to the exogenously-determined CPF (zt).     
 
                                                 
3
 Liang and Li (2012) estimated a unit CAPEX in US dollars equivalent to about £2/tonne for a post-
combustion capture process in a Chinese cement plant. This translates, using Ho et al.’s (2011) 
relational findings about cement- and power-plant capture CAPEX, to about £3/tonne.  
4
 For examples, see Rubin et al. (2007) and Yeh et al. (2007) on the quantification and benefits of LBD. 
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(b) the stochastic variables   
The remaining variables in the capture investor’s objective function in 
equation 2.1 are the OPEX and the shadow revenue Zt.  Of these Zt and the 
capture OPEX, Bt, and their components are assumed to be stochastic 
while the transport OPEX, Nt, and the storage OPEX, St, are treated as 
being parametric and linked directly to their corresponding values in the 
cash flow statements of the transport and storage investors.  The 
recognised stochasticity of Nt and St more directly influence the pipeline 
and storage activity and investments levels and are treated as such. 
Table 1 presents the projected values of the stochastic variables and/or 
their determinants.  Table 2 summarises the best-fit probability 
distribution of the projected values.  
 
Table 1: Projected values of the capture investment stochastic drivers 
Year Coal Price 
(£/tonne)   
(real 2010) 
Emission 
reduction 
target (%) 
% of 
emission 
captured (%) 
Capture-
induced 
efficiency-
loss 
Carbon Price 
Floor 
(£/tCO2) 
      2020 71 6 na na 30 
2023 71 6 40 20 42 
2030 71 11 90 18 70 
2040 70 14 95 15 75 
2050 85 14 95 12 78 
Sources and notes:  
Na = not applicable 
Column (1): (a) 2020-2030: DECC (2011) (b) 2031-2050: Authors’ own 
projections. 
Column (2): Average coal-based power industry projection (see for 
example, Drax (2011). 
Column (3): The full capture capacity is variously cited in the literature as 
being around 90 percent (see DECC, 2009a, for example). 
Column (4): In the literature, estimates of the parasitic effect vary from 
10 to about 40 percent of OPEX (see Bellona, 2005, for 
example). The present study assumes that the parasitic 
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effects range from a high of 20% reducing to about 12% due 
to LBD effects. 
Column (5): The data range is broadly consistent with DECC’s 
projections as cited by Mott MacDonald (2010). In DECC’s 
central case, the carbon price increases from £16/tCO2 in 
2020 to £70/tCO2 in 2030 and £135/tCO2 in 2040, with an 
average of £54/tCO2.  The modelling follows this trend. 
 
Table 2: Probabilistic variables of CO2 capture investment  
Probabilistic 
variable 
Data range Best-fit probability distribution 
Minimum Maximum Type Parameters 
Coal price 
(£/tonne) 
71.00
a 
97.00 Weibull Location = 34.00; Scale = 43.00; 
Shape = 3.05 
Emission 
reduction target 
(ERT) (%) 
3.07
b 
14.78 Beta Alpha = 0.91; Beta = 0.39 
Percentage of 
emissions 
captured 
40.00 95.00
 
Discrete 
Uniform 
Min. = 40.00; Max = 95.00 
Parasitic CO2 
capture effect on 
OPEX 
12.25
d 
20.40 Beta Alpha = 0.77; Beta = 0.86;  
The Carbon Price 
Floor (CPF) 
(£/tCO2)  
70.00 
(€60.00) 
90.00
e
 
(€120.00) 
Triangular Min. = 70.00; Max. = 90.00; 
Likeliest = 70.00 
a DECC (2011) central value of projected coal prices. 
b
 Drax (2009) 
c
 The full capture rate is variously cited in the literature as being around 
90-95% (e.g. DECC, 2010). 
d
 In the literature, estimates of the parasitic effect is in the range 10%-
40% of OPEX (e.g. Bellona, 2005).  
e
 The data range is broadly consistent with DECC’s projections as cited 
by Mott MacDonald (2010). 
 
 i Coal price 
A major component of the fuel and non-fuel capture OPEX, Bt, is the 
incremental cost of coal.   The 2012-2030 coal price projections were 
obtained from DECC (2011) while the 2031-2050 projections were 
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calculated by the authors, based on a stochastic price model
5
.  A summary 
of the projected coal prices is presented in Table 1 while the price 
forecast methodology is presented in Appendix 1.1.  The randomly 
generated time path of coal prices in is fitted to a number of probability 
distribution curves to determine a best fit for use in the stochastic 
optimisation.  Using the Anderson-Darling (A-D) probability curve-
fitting criterion in this and all other cases, the best-fitting probability 
distribution of the projected coal price was found to be the Weibull 
distribution
6,7
.  This result is presented in Table 2.  The cumulative 
probability distribution suggests that there is a 60% chance of realising a 
real2010 coal price of £75/tonne or less during the forecast period.  
 
ii. Capture-induced plant efficiency loss  
CO2 capture substantially adds to a power plant’s investment, energy and 
fuel costs.  However, there is a general expectation that the experience 
gained through learning-by-doing (LBD) will mitigate the costs in the 
long-term.  In the literature, estimates of the capture-induced parasitic 
effect on costs vary from 10% to about 40% of OPEX (see Bellona, 
2005).  The present study assumes that the effects could range from a 
high of 20% reducing to 12% over the study period. This range is close to 
the  25%, 18%, 15% and 13% in 2013, 2020, 2028, and 2040 respectively 
assumed in DECC (2012c).  The projected plant efficiency losses are 
presented in Table 1.  
 
                                                 
5
 Unlike the other capture-related model variables with no historic data, the availability of historic data 
on coal prices permits the formulation, estimation and forecast of a stochastic price model. 
6
 The Weibull distribution was the best-fitting under the Chi-square criterion during the period 1993-
2011.  
7
 The top three best fits are Weibull (0.323), Lognormal (0.334) and Gamma (0.343). 
14 
 
In Table 2, the best-fit of the underlying probability distribution of the 
forecast is a beta distribution
8
.  The cumulative probability distribution 
suggests that there is a 30% chance that the capture-induced loss in plant 
efficiency can be reduced from about 20% to about 14% during the study 
period. 
 
iii Carbon Price Floor (zt) 
In order to reduce risk and encourage low-carbon electricity generation, 
the UK Government has introduced a Carbon Price Floor (CPF) that 
became operational from April 2013 (HM Treasury, 2010, 2011).  The 
CPF starts at around £16/tCO2, rising linearly to £30/tCO2 in 2020 and 
£70/tCO2 in 2030.  No official estimates are available for the period 
2031-2050.  This study acknowledges that the CPF may fluctuate during 
this later period.  The official and projected CPFs are presented in Table 
1.  A triangular probability distribution of the deterministic forecast was 
assumed in Table 2.  The minimum and maximum CPF values were 
respectively assumed to be £70/tonne and £90/tonne with the likeliest 
being £70/tonne.  The cumulative distribution suggests that there is an 
80% chance of the CPF not exceeding £83/tonne between 2031 and 2050.   
 
 (iv) Other (physical) influencing variables 
The levels of the various costs and revenues discussed thus far depend on 
the amount of CO2 captured, Q.  However, Q itself is a function of the 
capture investor’s emission reduction programme (ERP) and the capture 
capacity (CC) at any point in time.  That is, Qt = f(ERPt, CCt). 
Both ERPt and CCt, are stochastic and affect the investor’s costs and 
revenues through their impact on Qt.   
 
                                                 
8
 The A-D top 3 test results are: Beta (0.119), Uniform (0.232) and Weibull (0.318). 
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a. Emission reduction target/programme (ERP) 
It is expected that, with increasing CO2 emission mitigation regulations, 
UK power plants will undertake ERPs with set performance targets – that 
is, emission reduction targets (ERTs).  ERTs include the rate at which 
renewable fuel sources and co-firing will replace fossil fuels, coupled 
with improvements in thermal efficiency through turbine upgrades.  Some 
coal-fired power plants such as Drax and Longannet (see Drax, 2012 and 
ScottishPower, 2009) have recently achieved between 3% and 4% 
reduction in their CO2 emission factors through turbine upgrade and co-
firing coal with biomass.  Higher and successful ERPs imply less CO2 
emissions to capture.  Considerable uncertainty surrounds the future level 
and pace of ERPs.  A summary of the deterministic projected ERT is 
presented in Table 1.  As shown in Table 2, the best-fit distribution of the 
forecast ERT is the beta probability distribution
9
.  The fitted distribution 
suggests that there is a 60% chance of achieving up to 15% annual 
emissions reduction by generating electricity through co-firing and 
turbine upgrades during the study period.  
 
b. Emissions capture capacity (CC) 
The emissions capture capacity CC is positively related to Q.   The full 
capture capacity is variously cited in the literature as being around 90% to 
99% of emissions (see DECC, 2012c).  This study assumes that the 
capture capacity/rate is built up over time, increasing with experience 
from about 40% in 2020 to about 95% in 2050
10
.  A summary of the 
projected capture rate is presented in Table 1.   
                                                 
9
 The top 3 best fits ranked by the Anderson-Darling test criterion are: Beta (3.0), Logistic (3.417), and 
Maximum Extreme (3.555). 
10
 The idea of a progressive roll-out of CO2 capture capacity is consistent with CCSA (2011), and 
DECC (2012) who assumed the rate would increase from 85% in 2013 to 90% by 2020. 
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In Table 2, the best-fit probability distribution of the deterministic 
forecast is the discrete uniform distribution
11
.  The cumulative probability 
distribution suggests that there is an 80% chance that a capture capacity 
of up to 84% of emissions would be attained during the study period.  
 
CO2 storage investment (Oilfield Z)  
(a) The decision variables  
At the EOR-storage stage, the two decision variables are the level of 
CAPEX and the storage fee.   Relating to equation (2.2), the CAPEX, Cs0 
and s
t  are the incremental costs of converting or modifying existing 
facilities at the oil field, while the storage fee, p2s, is assumed to be related 
to the OPEX.  For Field Z  the incremental CAPEX for CO2-EOR and 
subsequent sequestration is assumed to range between £900 million and 
£1.2 billion
12
.  The unit CO2 storage fee is assumed to range between 10 
and 20 percent above the unit field OPEX in the post-EOR period. 
 
(b) The stochastic variables  
Using equation (2.2) the key variables whose future time paths are 
uncertain are the oil price, s
t
p , EOR yield, gt, and the injection (x1t) and 
monitoring (αt) cost components of OPEX, Xt.  The projected values of 
these variables are presented in Table 3 while their best-fit probability 
distributions are presented in Table 4. 
  
                                                 
11
 Ranked by the Chi-Square test criterion which was the only one available for the forecast data.  The 
top 3 best fits are: Discrete Uniform (44.212), Binomial (59.080), and Negative Binomial (68.744).  
12
 For comparison, the Scottish Centre for Carbon Storage (SCCS) assumed that the CO2-EOR CAPEX 
for the following large oilfields in the Central North Sea could be: Claymore £1.1 to £1.2 billion, Scott 
£1.2 billion and Buzzard £700 million (SCCS, 2009). 
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Table 3: Projected values of the storage investment stochastic drivers 
Year Injection cost 
(£/tCO2) 
(real2010) 
Monitoring 
cost (% of 
cumulative 
CAPEX) 
Oil price  
£/bbl( $) 
(real2010) 
CO2 injection 
yield 
(bbl/tCO2) 
2020 na na 60 (100) na 
2023 7 2 80 (124) 0.29 
2025 7 2 90 (140) 0.40 
2030 6 3 95 (148) 0.68 
2040 5 3 80 (124) 1.63 
2050 4 2   
Sources and notes:  
Column (1): Authors’ own projections based on Poyry (2007) 
Column (2): Authors’ own projections based on Poyry (2007) 
Column (3): Authors’ own projections based on EIA (2010)  
Column (4): Authors’ own projections based on Senergy (2009).   
 
Table 4: Probabilistic variables of CO2 storage investment 
Probabilistic variable 
Data range Best-fit probability distribution 
Minimum Maximum Type Parameters 
Common uncertainties 
Injection OPEX 
(£/tCO2) 
4.21
a 
7.34 Beta Alpha = 0.88; Beta = 
1.09 
Monitoring OPEX (% of 
accumulated CAPEX) 
1.55 2.70 Beta Alpha = 0.88; Beta = 
1.09 
CO2-EOR yield 
(barrels/tCO2) 
0.20
b 
1.20 Triangular Minimum = 0.20; 
Maximum = 1.20; 
Likeliest = 1.00 
Oil price  (£/bbl)  65.00
c
 
($100.00) 
135.00 
($208.00) 
Weibull Scale = 81.00; Shape = 
4.31; Location = 3.00 
a
  In the literature estimates lie in the range £4 - £8/tCO2 (e.g. Poyry, 
2007).  
b
  Source: Senergy (2009). 
c
  Source: EIA (2010).  
 
i. oil price ( s
t
p ) 
This study assumes that the price of oil in the world market will rise 
substantially in the long term but continue to be volatile.  Consistent with 
the EIA (2010) Reference Scenario forecast, the mean-reverting long-
term average price was assumed to be £80 ($124) per barrel with the 
18 
 
respective lower and upper bounds of £64 ($100) and £106 ($165).  The 
EIA projections end in 2035.  In order to project oil prices beyond that 
date, this study used the same mean-reverting commodity price model as 
for coal, using a mean-reversion speed of 50% per annum and volatility 
of 25%.   As shown in Table 4, the best-fit probability distribution of the 
projected oil price was found to be the Weibull distribution.  There is a 
60% chance that the real oil price will reach £80 per barrel or more 
during the study period.  
 
ii. CO2-EOR yield (gt) 
Considerable uncertainties exist about the CO2 –EOR yield.  Estimates in 
the literature range from 1 to 4 barrels per tonne of CO2 injected.  Bellona 
(2005) and Tzimas et al. (2005) in separate studies assumed 3 barrels per 
tonne of CO2 injected
13
.  This study uses a more conservative yield 
estimate based on a report by Senergy for the SCCS (2009).  This 
increases from 0.20 to 1.20 barrels of oil per tonne of CO2 injected, 
before diminishing returns set in about halfway through the EOR phase.  
The projected EOR yields are presented in Table 3.   
 
In Table 4, the best-fit probability distribution is seen to be triangular 
with the likeliest yield of 1 barrel of oil per tonne of CO2 injected.  There 
is a 60% chance that up to one barrel of oil per tonne of CO2 injected can 
be produced during the study period. 
 
 iii injection and monitoring OPEX (x1t and α) 
Various estimates of the cost per unit of CO2 injected, x1t, exist in the 
literature (see Poyry (2007), for example).  Based on these this study 
assumes an annual injection OPEX of  £4 to £7 per tonne of CO2 injected 
                                                 
13
 See, also, USA Department of Energy (2006). 
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and an annual monitoring OPEX, α, of 2% to 3% of incremental CAPEX.  
Gains from LBD effects are assumed to contribute to reductions in both 
the injection and monitoring costs over time.  The projected costs are 
summarised in Table 3.     
 
In Table 4, the best-fit probability distribution of the projected injection 
OPEX is the beta distribution.  There is a 60% chance that the injection 
cost will not exceed £6/tCO2.  The best-fit probability distribution of the 
projected monitoring OPEX is the beta distribution.  The cumulative 
probability distribution suggests that there is a 60% chance that a value 
less than or equal to 2% of cumulative CAPEX can be achieved.   
 
CO2 transportation investment 
(a) The decision variables 
Given his objective function in equation (2.3), the CO2 transporter is 
assumed to have some control over his CAPEX, Ca0, and acceptable 
transportation charges, nt.  Treating the transporter as a utility company, 
transportation charges are assumed to be determined on a cost plus 
margin basis.  The aggregate pipeline CAPEX for the onshore and subsea 
components is assumed to range between £1.6 million to £2.5 million per 
kilometre.  This is more conservative than the £1.5 million to £1.9 million 
range in DECC (2012).  It is assumed that the transportation charges are 
in two parts.  One is a margin component specified as a percentage of 
OPEX, yt (see DECC, 2009b).  This study treats the tariff margin as a 
decision variable with assumed values ranging between 20 and 40 percent 
of OPEX. 
  
20 
 
 
(b) the stochastic variable   
The second transportation charge is a tariff component related to the 
pipeline CAPEX which is treated as a stochastic variable, owing to the 
non-standardisation of rules governing pipeline capacity trading in the 
UKCS (DECC, 2009).  Much depends on the local monopoly power of 
the asset owner and/or the level of service required.  Tables 5 and 6 
respectively show the projected normalized transportation tariff and its 
best-fit probability distribution. 
 
Table 5: The Projected CO2 Pipeline Transportation Tariff 
(£/tCO2/100 km) 
Year Normalised tariff  
2023 2.49 
2030 2.00 
2040 1.70 
2050 1.55 
       Source: Authors’ own estimates 
 
 Table 6: Probabilistic variable of CO2 transportation investment 
Probabilistic variable 
Data range Best-fit probability distribution 
Minimum Maximum Type Parameters 
Normalised pipeline tariff 
(£/tCO2/100 km) 
1.55
 
2.70 Beta Alpha = 0.88; Beta = 1.09; 
Min. = 1.55; Max. = 2.70 
 
This study assumes that the pipeline investor is able to charge a 
normalized pipeline tariff of between £1.55 and £2.59 per tonne of CO2 
transported per 100 kilometres.  The deterministic projected normalised 
pipeline tariff is presented in Table 5. 
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Table 6 indicates that the best-fit probability distribution of the projected 
normalised pipeline tariff is the beta distribution.  There is a 60% chance 
of a normalised pipeline tariff of £2.15 or more during the study period. 
 
4. Model optimisation, results and discussion 
In order to investigate the CCS investors’ positions, the model in Section 
2 was optimised from the respective perspectives of the capture and 
storage investors, with the transporter being treated as a utility.  The 
numerical optimisation runs were performed with Crystal Ball, with each 
run consisting of 1000 Monte Carlo simulations and 1500 trials per 
simulation.  Optimal results were obtained for High- and Medium Emitter 
scenarios but only the latter are presented and discussed below
14
.    
The returns to the CCS investors under two alternative investment 
climates are shown in Figures 1 to 6. 
 
i. Returns to the capture investment under two investment 
scenarios. 
Fig. 1: The NPV of the capture investment (£ million, 2010) (Plant B) 
  
 
                                                 
14
 The interested reader may obtain the High-Emitter results from the corresponding author.  The High-
Emitter case assumes the involvement in the CCS value chain of a high CO2-emitting PCSCFGD 
power plant with annual emissions of between 18 and 21 MtCO2/year.  
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A cumulative total of 199 mtCO2 or an average 7 mtCO2 per annum was 
emitted, captured, and stored.  The optimal CAPEX for the capturer is 
£721 million.  As seen in the LHP of Fig. 1, under capture-favourable 
assumptions, Plant B’s NPV ranges from £753 million to £923 million, 
with a mean of £833 million.  Underlying the investment returns are an 
optimal carbon price, p1, of £43/tCO2 and a post-EOR storage cost, p2, of 
£36/tCO2.  In the RHP the NPV range is between -£51 million and £126 
million, with a mean of £26 million under EOR-friendly assumptions. 
There is a much lower optimal carbon price, p1, of £22/tCO2 and a higher 
post-EOR storage cost, p2, of £37/tCO2.   There is a 10 percent chance of 
sustaining a negative NPV.  Regardless of the predominant investment 
climate, the sensitivity of the capture investment NPV to the model’s 
stochastic variables was tested with the results shown in Fig. 2 below. 
 
Fig. 2: Sensitivity of capture investment NPV (£ million, 2010) 
 
 
Fig. 2 shows that the returns to the capture investment are most sensitive 
to variations in the CPF, zt, especially in the years 2031 through 2035.  
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The two CPF prices to which the capture investment NPV is most 
sensitive are £71/tCO2 and £84/tCO2.  The latter is the upside of the 
variable while the former is the downside.  
 
ii. Returns to the EOR investment under two investment scenarios.  
Fig. 3: The NPV of CO2-EOR investment (£ million) (real2010) (Field Z) 
  
 
The optimal CO2-EOR investment in both scenarios was determined as 
£901 million.  The total EOR is 131 mmbbls.  Under the capture-
favourable conditions in the LHP of Fig. 3, the NPV ranges from £4 
million to £617 million with a mean of £298 million. The optimal oil 
price, s
t
p , during the EOR-phase is £110/bbl, while the optimal post-EOR 
storage fee, p2s, received is £36/tCO2.  Under EOR-favourable conditions 
the minimum investment return is £229 million, with a maximum of £816 
million and a mean of £484 million.  Much of the improvement in this 
scenario emanates from the substantial reduction in the CO2 cost from, p1s, 
£43/tCO2 to £22/tCO2 and the higher storage fee, p2s, of £37/tCO2.  
Both the coefficient of variability (not shown) and NPV range are 
significantly greater in the RHP than the LHP, underlining the point that 
even under more favourable conditions, returns to EOR investment 
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remain risky.  The main reason for this can be seen in Fig. 4 which shows 
the sensitivity of the NPV to oil prices. 
 
Fig. 4: The sensitivity of the storage investment NPV (£ million, 2010) 
 
 
 
Oil prices ranging from £94/bbl to £99/bbl are seen to have downside 
effects on the NPV while prices ranging from £104/bbl to £148/bbl have 
the opposite effect.   
 
The ranges of the optimal carbon prices and storage fees from the 
respective perspectives of the capture and EOR/storage investors are 
summarised in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Summary of negotiable p1 and p2 
Investment climate Average captured CO2 price (£/tCO2) Average storage fee (£/tCO2) 
   Capture-favourable (p1=)43 (p2=)36 
EOR-favourable (p1s=)22 (p2s=)37 
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iii. Returns to the transport investment under two investment 
scenarios 
 
Fig. 5: The NPV of transport investment (£ million, 2010) 
  
 
The optimal transport investment was determined as being £602 million.  
The differences in the capture- and EOR-friendly conditions make little 
difference to the profitability of the CO2 transport investment.  Fig. 5 
shows that the returns are virtually the same in both scenarios, consistent 
with the utility-type investment.  The NPV ranges from £4 million to £81 
million with a mean value of £40 million.   
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
10 22 35 47 60 71
p
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
fr
e
q
u
e
n
cy
£ million
Source B-to-Sink Z CCS investment: Transport investment NPV under 
capture-friendly conditions
26 
 
Fig. 6: The Sensitivity of transport investment NPV (£/tCO2/100 km) 
(real2010) 
 
Fig. 6 above shows that the transport investor’s NPV is very sensitive to 
the normalised pipeline tariff, with tariffs of £1.6 and £2.54 respectively 
having downside and upside effects on the NPV. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper an optimised investment model of the CCS chain has been 
developed both to enhance understanding of the uncertainties and to 
discover the conditions under which CCS development and deployment 
can be achieved in the UK/UKCS.  The chosen model involved trading 
relationships among investors at the capture, transportation, and 
EOR/storage stages of the CCS chain.  Reflecting the various risks 
involved several stochastic variables were incorporated in the design of 
the objective functions of each of the three investors.  A key feature of 
the modelling was the constraints imposed on the optimal solution for an 
investor at any one stage of the CCS chain being dependent on acceptable 
returns being expected by the other two investors in the chain.  The 
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modelling produced further insights into the nature of the problem by 
finding the optimal investment of each participant in the chain.  A 
consequence of this procedure was that two values for the optimal CO2 
prices and storage fees were found, reflecting the separate perspectives of 
the capture and EOR/ storage investors.  In the case of the Plant B the 
investor has an optimal asking CO2 price of £43/tCO2 while the storer’s 
optimal offer price is £22/tCO2.  With respect to the EOR-storage fee the 
corresponding optimal values are an offer price of £36/tCO2 from the 
capture investor’s perspective and an asking price of £37/tCO2 from the 
storer’s viewpoint.  Reflecting the mutual interdependence of the 
integrated CCS investments, while attempting to avert the tragedy of the 
anticommons (Parente, 2012), the parties can negotiate and reach a 
satisfactory agreement on the prices that would offer acceptable returns to 
their individual investments.  The price differentials show the scope for 
negotiation between the two parties, with any value within the range 
ensuring that the overall chain of investments remains viable.  The 
uncertainties and boundaries for negotiation among the parties can be 
reduced by the wider provision and sharing of the maximum amount of 
information on the likely costs of the various elements in the CCS chain, 
paving the way towards co-operative Nash equilibrium contractual terms.  
Both the broad range of prices of oil (£110/bbl to £114/bbl) and the 
traded CO2 (£22/tCO2 to £43/tCO2) required to ensure the optimality of 
the model solutions may appear rather high.  It should be noted, however, 
that the long-term oil price range is consistent with other studies 
including EIA (2010)
15
.  Also, the CO2 prices are consistent with those 
planned for the CPF.  The CPF mechanism involves the extension of the 
                                                 
15
SCCS (2009) suggests that oil prices above $100/bbl would be required to kick-start some CO2-EOR 
projects in the UKCS. 
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Climate Change Levy (CCL) to fossil fuels used for power generation
16
.  
The results of this study are useful in quantifying the level of price 
support that may be required.  Currently, EOR in the UKCS is fully 
subject to the North Sea oil taxation regime which entails tax at an overall 
rate of 81% on profits from fields developed before March 1993, and a 
rate of 62% on profits from fields developed after that date.  
Disincentives to EOR schemes can readily emerge, and tax reliefs for 
EOR projects could enhance investment incentives.  For example, the 
new Brownfield Allowance could readily be extended to apply to CO2 
EOR projects.    
  
                                                 
16
 Government revenue from CPF is projected to reach £1.4 billion as early as 2015-2016 (HM 
Treasury, 2011). 
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APPENDIX 1.1 
 
Assuming that the log of the coal price (At=log (     
 
)) follows a mean 
reversion process of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic type satisfying the 
differential equation:    
                       
    
                                                                                   
where:  
     
 
 = Coal spot price at time t 
            = Coal price reversion level  
Τ = Speed of reversion to the reversion level  
Σ = Instantaneous volatility 
dWt = Increment to a standard Brownian motion (Weiner process) 
 
The Weiner process (Wt) in equation (3.1) is assumed to be normally 
distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.  The 
Kalman filter methodology was employed to determine the parameter 
estimates (τ and σ) 17 from the expected terms of equation (3.1).  On the 
basis of the estimated results, presented in Appendix 1.1b, the study used 
τ = 60% per annum, σ = 25% and DECC’s (2011) projected coal price 
central value of around £70/tonne to randomly generate the projected coal 
prices
18
.  These are presented in Appendix 1.2. 
 
Kalman Filter Estimation Results  
In order to obtain the two key parameters used in the projection, the 
historical data on coal prices (1991-2011)
19
 were divided into sub-periods 
                                                 
17
 The historic UK’s 1992-2011 coal prices dataset used to estimate the linear state-space model are in 
Appendix 1.1a.  A summary of the Kalmer Filter estimation results are presented in Appendix 1.1b. 
18
 Being randomly generated there are several possible time paths of the future coal price, but only one 
sample path is presented in Appendix 1.2 
19
 Data obtained from DECC Quarterly Energy Prices (Table 3.2.1) - several years. 
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to get a clearer picture of a trend.  By segmenting the dataset into sub-
periods (for example, 1996-2011, 2000-2011 etc.) the estimated linear 
state-space model yielded (in the EViews econometric package used for 
the purpose) the following results: 
period volatility (σ) reversion 
speed (τ) 
log likelihood probability of rejection 
volatility reversion 
speed 
1991-2011 0.138 0.999 7.363 0.000 0.000 
2000-2011 0.164 0.997 1.921 0.000 0.000 
2003-2011 0.187 0.797 1.823 0.000 0.115 
2004-2011 0.193 0.670 1.513 0.000 0.267 
2005-2011 0.189 0.440 1.609 0.005 0.486 
2006-2011 0.174 0.232 1.945 0.006 0.669 
 
In summary, the estimated price volatility (σ) and mean-reversion (τ) 
speed parameters lie in the following ranges: 
14 %< σ<20% 
23 %< τ<90%  
 
